AND THUS our conception of free will and necessity is gradually diminished or increased according to the degree of connection with the external world, the degree of remoteness in time, and the degree of dependence on causes which we see in the phenomenon of man’s life that we examine. —
因此，我们对自由意志和必然性的观念会根据所考察的人类生活现象与外界的联系程度，时间的远近以及行为背后的原因依赖程度的增减而逐渐减弱或增强。 —

So that if we examine the case of a man in which the connection with the external world is better known, the interval of time between the examination and the act greater, and the causes of the action easier to comprehend, we form a conception of a greater element of necessity and less free will. —
因此，如果我们考察一个与外界的联系更为清楚的人的情况，考察与行为之间的时间间隔更大，并且行为的原因更容易理解，我们就会形成对必然性成分更多、自由意志成分更少的概念。 —

If we examine a man in a less close dependence on external conditions, if his action is committed at a moment nearer the present, and the causes leading him to it are beyond our ken, we form a conception of a less element of necessity and a greater element of free will in his action.
如果我们考察一个与外部条件的联系不太密切的人，如果他的行为发生在更接近现在的时刻，并且导致他行动的原因超出我们的理解能力，我们就会形成对必然性成分更少、自由意志成分更多的概念。

But in neither case, however we shift our point of view, however clear we make to ourselves the connection in which the man is placed with the external world, or however fully comprehensible it may appear to us, however long or short a period of time we select, however explicable or unfathomable the causes of the act may be to us, we can never conceive of complete free will, nor of complete necessity in any action.
但是无论我们如何改变观察角度，无论我们将人与外界的联系清楚地展现在心中，无论我们选择多长或短的时间段，无论我们对行为的原因是否能明确解释或深入了解，我们永远无法想象完全自由的意志，也无法想象任何行为的完全必然性。

1. However carefully we imagine a man excluded from the influence of the external world, we can never form a conception of freedom in space. —
   然而我们再怎么细心地想象一个与外界影响隔离的人，我们也无法形成对空间自由的概念。 —
   

Every act of man’s is inevitably limited by what surrounds him and by his own body. —
每个人的行为都受到周围环境和自身身体的限制。 —

I raise my arm and let it fall. My action seems to me free; —
我举起手臂然后放下。我觉得我的动作是自由的； —

but asking myself could I raise my arm in any direction, I see that I moved it in the direction in which there was least hindrance to the action arising from bodies around me or from the construction of my own body. —
但是当我问自己我是否能够将手臂向任何方向抬起时，我发现我将手臂移动的方向是周围物体或我的身体结构对动作产生最少阻碍的方向。 —

I chose one out of all the possible directions, because in that direction I met with least hindrance. —
我选择了所有可能的方向中的一个，因为在那个方向上遇到的阻碍最少。 —

For my action to be entirely free, it would have to meet with no hindrance in any direction. —
要使我的行动完全自由，它就不能在任何方向上遇到阻碍。 —

To conceive a man quite free, we have to conceive him outside of space, which is obviously impossible.
要想象一个完全自由的人，我们必须把他想象在空间之外，这显然是不可能的。

1. However near we bring the time of criticism to the time of action, we can never form a conception of freedom in time. —
   无论我们把批判的时间接近行动的时间多么接近，我们都无法形成时间上的自由的概念。 —
   

For if I examine an act committed a second ago, I must still recognise that it is not free, since the act is irrevocably linked to the moment at which it was committed. —
因为如果我审视一秒钟之前做出的行动，我仍然必须承认它不是自由的，因为这个行动与它被做出的时刻密不可分。 —

Can I lift my arm? I lift it; but I ask myself: —
我能举起我的手吗？我举了起来；但我问自己： —

Could I not have lifted my arm in that moment of time that has just passed? —
在刚刚过去的那一瞬间，我不能举起我的手吗？ —

To convince myself of that, I do not lift my arm the next moment. —
为了让自己相信这一点，我不会在下一瞬间举起手臂。 —

But I am not abstaining from lifting it that first moment of which I asked myself the question. —
但是我并没有在第一瞬间放弃举起它的动作。 —

The time has gone by and to detain it was not in my power, and the hand which I then raised and the air in which I raised it are not the same as the hand I do not raise now or the air in which I do not now raise it. —
时间已经过去了，我无法阻止它，那时我举起的手和我现在不举起的手，举起它的空气也不同。 —

The moment in which the first movement took place is irrevocable, and in that moment I could only perform one action, and whatever movement I had made, that movement could have been the only one. —
第一个动作发生的瞬间是无法挽回的，在那一瞬间，我只能完成一种行动，无论我做出什么动作，那个动作都是唯一的。 —

The fact that the following moment I abstained from lifting my arm did not prove that I could have abstained from lifting it. —
下一瞬间我没有举起手臂并不能证明我本来可以不举起它。 —

And since my movement could only be one in one moment of time, it could have been no other. —
既然我的动作在一瞬间只能是一种，它就不能是其他的。 —

To conceive it to oneself as free, one must conceive it in the present on the boundary between the past and the future, that is, outside time, which is impossible.
要想象它是自由的，就必须把它想象在过去和未来之间的现在，也就是在时间之外，这是不可能的。

1. However we increase the degree of difficulty of comprehending the causes of the act, we never reach a conception of complete free will, that is, absolute absence of cause. —
   无论我们提高理解行动原因的 Schwierigkeit 如何，我们始终不能达到完全自由的概念，即绝对没有原因的存在。 —
   

Though the cause of the expression of will in any act of our own or another’s may be beyond our ken, it is the first impulse of the intellect to presuppose and seek a cause, without which no phenomenon is conceivable. —
虽然我们自己或他人的任何行动的表达的原因可能超出我们的认知范围，但智力的第一冲动是假定并寻求一个原因，没有原因，没有现象是可以想象的。 —

I raise my arm in order to perform an act independent of any cause, but the fact that I want to perform an act independent of any cause is the cause of my action.
我举起手臂是为了进行一个独立于任何原因的行动，但是我想进行一个独立于任何原因的行动的事实，正是导致了我的行动。

But even if by conceiving a man entirely excluded from external influence, and exercising only a momentary act in the present, not called forth by any cause, we were to reduce the element of necessity to an infinitesimal minimum equivalent to nil, we should even then not have reached a conception of complete free will in a man; —
但是即使我们想象一个完全不受外界影响的人，并且只在现在进行一次短暂的行动，这个行动不受任何原因的驱使，我们将必要性的元素减少到无限小的最小值，等于零，我们仍然无法达到对人完全自由意志的概念； —

for a creature, uninfluenced by the external world, outside of time, and independent of cause, is no longer a man.
因为一个不受外界世界、无时间限制和独立于原因的生物，已不再是一个人。

In the same way we can never conceive a human action subject only to necessity without any element of free will.
同样，我们无法想象一种只受必然性支配而没有任何自由意志的人类行为。

1. However we increase our knowledge of the conditions of space in which a man is placed, that knowledge can never be complete since the number of these conditions is infinitely great, seeing that space is in finite. —
   然而，无论我们提高对一个人所处空间条件的了解，这种知识永远不会是完整的，因为这些条件的数量是无限的，因为空间是无限的。 —
   

And so long as not all the conditions that may influence a man are defined, the circle of necessity is not complete, and there is still a loophole for free will.
只要我们无法定义可能影响一个人的所有条件，必然性的循环就不完整，自由意志仍有漏洞存在。

1. Though we may make the period of time intervening between an act and our criticism of it as long as we choose, that period will be finite, and time is infinite, and so in this respect too the circle of necessity is not complete.
   即使我们将一个行为和对其进行批判之间的时间段延长到我们所选择的任意长，那个时间段仍然是有限的，而时间是无限的，因此在这方面，必然性的循环也不完整。

2. However easy the chain of causation of any act may be to grasp, we shall never know the whole chain, since it is endless, and so again we cannot attain absolute necessity.
   无论任何行为的因果链条有多容易把握，我们永远不会知道整个链条，因为它是无尽的，所以我们无法达到绝对的必然性。

But apart from that, even if, reducing the minimum of free will till it is equivalent to nil, we were to admit in some case—as, for instance, that of a dying man, an unborn babe, an idiot—a complete absence of free will, we should in so doing have destroyed the very conception of man, in the case we are examining; —
但是除此之外，即使我们将自由意志的最小限度减少到等于零，并且在某些情况下，比如垂死的人、未出生的婴儿、智力低下者等，承认完全没有自由意志，我们在此过程中已经破坏了我们所考察的人的概念； —

since as soon as there is no free will, there is no man. —
因为一旦没有了自由意志，就没有人存在。 —

And therefore the conception of the action of a man subject only to the law of necessity, without the smallest element of free will, is as impossible as the conception of a completely free human action.
因此，仅受必然法则支配、没有丝毫自由意志的人的行为的概念就像完全自由的人的行动的概念一样不可能。

Thus to conceive a human action subject only to the law of necessity without free will, we must assume a knowledge of an infinite number of conditions in space, an infinitely long period of time, and an infinite chain of causation.
因此，要构想一个仅受必然法则支配、没有自由意志的人的行动，我们必须假设对无限多个空间条件、无限长的时间以及无限的因果链的知识。

To conceive a man perfectly free, not subject to the law of necessity, we must conceive a man outside of space, outside of time, and free from all dependence on cause.
要构想一个完全自由的人，不受必然法则制约，我们必须构想一个超越空间、超越时间、没有任何原因依赖的人。

In the first case, if necessity were possible without free will, we should be brought to a definition of the laws of necessity in the terms of the same necessity, that is, to mere form without content.
在第一种情况下，如果必然性在没有自由意志的情况下是可能的，我们将陷入用必然性的术语对必然性法则进行定义，也就是纯粹的形式而没有内容。

In the second case, if free will were possible without necessity, we should come to unconditioned free will outside of space, and time and cause, which by the fact of its being unconditioned and unlimited would be nothing else than content without form.
在第二种情况下，如果自由意志在没有必然性的情况下是可能的，我们将陷入超越空间、时间和原因的无条件自由意志，它由于其无条件和无限制将不过是没有形式的内容。

We should be brought in fact to these two fundamental elements, of which man’s whole cosmic conception is made up—the incomprehensible essence of life and the laws that give form to that essence.
实际上，我们将归结为人类整个宇宙观的这两个基本要素——生命的不可理解本质和赋予那种本质形式的法则。

Reason says: 1. space with all the forms given it by its visibility—matter—is infinite, and is not thinkable otherwise.
理性说：1.带有所有由其可见性赋予的形式（物质）的空间是无限的，且无法以其他方式思考。

1. Time is infinite movement without one moment of rest, and it is not otherwise thinkable.
   2.时间是毫无休止的无限运动，且无法以其他方式思考。

2. The connection of cause and effect has no beginning, and can have no end.
   3.因果关系没有起点，也不能有终点。

Consciousness says: 1. I alone am, and all that exists is only I; consequently I include space.
意识说：1.只有我，一切存在只是我；因此，我包含了空间。

1. I measure moving time by the unchanging moment of the present, in which alone I am conscious of myself living; —
   2.我用不变的现在时刻来衡量流动的时间，在其中我唯一意识到自己活着； —
   

consequently I am outside of time, and
因此，我处在时间之外，且

1. I am outside of cause, since I feel myself the cause of every phenomenon of my life.
   3.我超越了因果关系，因为我感觉自己是我生活中每一个现象的原因。
   

Reason gives expression to the laws of necessity. —
理性表达了必然性法则。 —

Consciousness gives expression to the reality of free will.
意识表达了自由意志的实际。

Freedom unlimited by anything is the essence of life in man’s consciousness. —
自由无限制地任何事物都是人类意识中的生命精华。 —

Necessity without content is man’s reason with its three forms of thought.
没有内容的必要性是人类理性的三种思维形式。

Free will is what is examined: Necessity is what examines. Free will is content: Necessity is form.
自由意志是所被考察的：必要性是所进行考察的。自由意志是内容：必要性是形式。

It is only by the analysis of the two sources of knowledge, standing to one another in the relation of form and content, that the mutually exclusive, and separately inconceivable ideas of free will and necessity are formed.
只有通过对两种知识源的分析，它们在形式和内容上相互关联的关系形成了互相排斥、独立难以想象的自由意志和必要性的概念。

Only by their synthesis is a clear conception of the life of man gained.
只有通过它们的综合，才能获得对人的生活的清晰概念。

Outside these two ideas—in their synthesis mutually definitive as form and content—no conception of life is possible.
在这两个概念之外——在它们的综合中相互定义为形式和内容——生命的概念是不可能的。

All that we know of men’s life is only a certain relation of free will to necessity, that is, of consciousness to the laws of reason.
我们所知道的有关人类生活的一切仅仅是自由意志与必要性的某种关系，即意识与理性法则的关系。

All that we know of the external world of nature is only a certain relation of the forces of nature to necessity, or of the essence of life to the laws of reason.
我们对自然外部世界的一切了解只是自然力与必然性的某种关系，或者说生命的本质与理性法则的关系。

The forces of the life of nature lie outside us, and not subject to our consciousness; —
自然生命力的力量存在于我们之外，不受我们的意识支配。 —

and we call these forces gravity, inertia, electricity, vital force, and so on. —
我们将这些力量称为重力、惯性、电力、生命力等。 —

But the force of the life of man is the subject of our consciousness, and we call it free will.
但人的生命力是我们意识的对象，我们将其称为自由意志。

But just as the force of gravitation—in itself incomprehensible, though felt by every man—is only so far understood by us as we know the laws of necessity to which it is subject (from the first knowledge that all bodies are heavy down to Newton’s law), so too the force of free will, unthinkable in itself, but recognised by the consciousness of every man, is only so far understood as we know the laws of necessity to which it is subject (from the fact that every man dies up to the knowledge of the most complex economic or historic laws).
然而就像引力的力量本身无法理解但却被每个人所感知一样，我们只有了解它受制于必然性的法则（从最初知道所有物体都有重量到牛顿定律），才能在我们的意识中理解自由意志的力量。虽然自由意志本身无法想象，但它却被每个人的意识所承认。我们只有知道它受制于必然性的法则（从每个人会死亡的事实到最复杂的经济或历史法则），才能在意识中理解它的力量。

All knowledge is simply bringing the essence of life under the laws of reason.
所有知识只是将生命的本质纳入理性的法则之下。

Man’s free will is distinguished from every other force by the fact that it is the subject of man’s consciousness. —
人的自由意志与其他任何力量的不同之处在于它是人的意识的对象。 —

But in the eyes of reason it is not distinguished from any other force.
但在理性的眼中，它与任何其他力量都没有区别。

The forces of gravitation, of electricity, or of chemical affinity, are only distinguished from one another by being differently defined by reason. —
重力、电力或化学亲和力等力量只有因为被理性以不同方式定义而彼此区分。 —

In the same way the force of man’s free will is only distinguished by reason from the other forces of nature by the definition given it by reason. —
同样地，人的自由意志的力量只有因为被理性定义而与自然的其他力量有所区别。 —

Free will apart from necessity, that is, apart from the laws of reason defining it, is in no way different from gravitation, or heat, or the force of vegetation; —
除了必然性之外的自由意志，也就是没有被理性定义的自由意志，与引力、热量或植物的力量没有任何不同； —

for reason, it is only a momentary, indefinite sensation of life.
对理性来说，它只是生命的瞬间、模糊的感知。

And as the undefined essence of the force moving the heavenly bodies, the undefined essence of the force of heat, of electricity, or of chemical affinity, or of vital force, forms the subject of astronomy, physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, and so on, so the essence of the force of free will forms the subject matter of history. —
正如引导天体运动的未知力量的本质、引导热力、电力、化学亲和力或生命力的未知力量的本质一样，成为天文学、物理学、化学、植物学、动物学等学科的主题，自由意志的力量本质成为历史学的主题。 —

But even as the subject of every science is the manifestation of that unknown essence of life, yet that essence itself can only be the subject of metaphysics, so too the manifestation of the force of free will in space, and time, and dependence on cause, forms the subject of history, but free will itself is the subject of metaphysics.
然而，就像每个科学的主题都是未知生命本质的表现一样，而本质自身只能成为形而上学的主题，同样，自由意志的力量在空间、时间和因果关系中的表现成为历史学的主题，但自由意志本身是形而上学的主题。

In the experimental sciences, what is known to us we call the laws of necessity; —
在实验科学中，我们所知道的被称为必然的法则； —

what is unknown to us we call vital force. —
我们不知道的被称为生命力。 —

Vital force is simply an expression for what remains unexplained by what we know of the essence of life. —
生命力只是我们对生命本质所知不足之处的表达。 —

So in history what is known to us we call the laws of necessity; —
因此，在历史学中，我们所知道的被称为必然的法则； —

what is unknown, we call free will. Free will is for history simply an expression for what remains unexplained by the laws of men’s life that we know.
我们不知道的被称为自由意志。自由意志对于历史学而言只是一个表达，是我们所知的人类生活法则无法解释的部分。