WHAT RUSSIAN READER has not known an irksome feeling of annoyance, dissatisfaction, and perplexity, when he reads the accounts of the latter period of the campaign of 1812? —
有哪个俄罗斯读者没有感到恼怒、不满和困惑，当他阅读到1812年战役后期的描述时？ —

Who has not asked himself: How was it all the French were not captured or cut to pieces, when all the three Russian armies were surrounding them in superior numbers, when the French were a disorderly, starving, and freezing rabble, and the whole aim of the Russians (so history tells us) was to check, to cut off, and to capture all the French?
有谁没有问过自己：当三支俄罗斯军队在人数上占优势，法国人却处于一团糟的状态，又饥饿又冻得要命时，为什么他们并没有全被俘获或击溃？同时俄军的整个目标（历史告诉我们）是要遏制、切断并俘虏所有的法国人。

How was it that the Russian army, that with inferior numbers had fought the battle of Borodino, failed in its aim of capturing the French, when the latter were surrounded on three sides? —
俄军在不占优势的情况下打了博罗金诺战役，为什么没有实现俘获法国人的目标，尽管法国人已被包围在3个方向上？ —

Can the French be so immensely superior to us that we are not equal to beating them, when we have surrounded them with forces numerically superior? —
难道法国人真的比我们强大到我们无法战胜他们吗？当我们在数量上占优势的情况下把他们包围起来时？ —

How could that have come to pass? History (what passes by that name) answers these questions by saying that that came to pass because Kutuzov, and Tormasov, and Tchitchagov, and this general and that failed to carry out certain man?uvres.
这是怎么发生的呢？历史（所谓的历史）通过说，这是因为库图佐夫、托尔马索夫、奇奇亚戈夫和其他将领未能执行某些军事行动。

But why did they fail to carry them out? And how was it, if they really were responsible for not attaining the aim set before them, that they were not tried and punished for their shortcomings? —
但是他们为什么没有执行这些行动呢？如果他们真的对未能达到设定目标负有责任，他们为什么没有受到审判和惩罚？ —

But even if we admit that Kutuzov and Tchitchagov and the others were responsible for the non-success of the Russians, it is still impossible to understand why, in the position the Russian troops were in at Krasnoe and the Berezina, on both occasions with numerically superior forces, the French army and marshals were not taken prisoners, if that really was the aim of the Russians.
但是即使我们承认库图佐夫、奇奇亚戈夫和其他人对俄军的非成功负有责任，依然无法理解为什么在克拉斯诺耶和别列津纳两次，俄军占有数量上的优势，法国军队和元帅却没有被俘虏，如果这真的是俄军的目标。

The explanation of this phenomenon given by the Russian military historians—that Kutuzov hindered the attack—is insufficient, because we know that Kutuzov was not able to restrain the troops from attacking at Vyazma and Tarutino. —
由俄罗斯军事历史学家提供的解释（即库图佐夫阻止了进攻）是不足够的，因为我们知道库图佐夫无法阻止军队在维亚兹马和塔鲁京进攻。 —

Why was it that the Russian army, that with inferior forces gained a victory at Borodino over the enemy in full strength, was unsuccessful at Krasnoe and the Berezina, when fighting in superior numbers against the undisciplined crowds of the French?
为什么俄罗斯军队，在劣势的情况下，在博罗金诺战役中战胜了实力充沛的敌军，却在克拉斯诺耶和别列津纳战役中，以优势兵力对抗混乱的法国群众时失败了？

If the aim of the Russians really was to cut off Napoleon and his marshals, and to take them prisoners, and that aim was not only frustrated, but all attempts at attaining it were every time defeated in the most shameful way, this last period of the war is quite correctly represented by the French as a series of victories for them, and quite incorrectly represented by the Russians as redounding to our glory.
如果俄罗斯真的是要切断拿破仑和他的元帅们的退路，并将他们俘虏，而且这一目标不仅未能实现，而且每一次都以最可耻的方式失败了，那么这场战争的最后阶段确实被法国人正确地称为他们的胜利，而被俄罗斯人不正确地称为我们的荣耀。

The Russian military historians, so far as they recognise the claims of logic, are forced to this conclusion, and in spite of their lyric eulogies of Russian gallantry and devotion, and all the rest of it, they are reluctantly obliged to admit that the retreat of the French from Moscow was a series of victories for Napoleon and of defeats for Kutuzov.
俄罗斯军事历史学家即使承认了逻辑的要求，也不得不得出这个结论，尽管他们对俄罗斯的勇敢和忠诚等方面进行了抒情式的赞美，但他们不情愿地承认，法国人从莫斯科撤退是拿破仑的胜利，是库图佐夫的失败。

But putting patriotic vanity entirely aside, one cannot but feel that there is an inherent discrepancy in this conclusion, seeing that the series of French victories led to their complete annihilation, while the series of Russian defeats was followed by the destruction of their enemy, and the deliverance of their country.
但是，抛开爱国主义的虚荣心，我们不能不感到这个结论中存在着固有的矛盾，因为一系列法国的胜利导致了他们的彻底灭亡，而一系列俄罗斯的失败却导致了敌人的毁灭和他们祖国的解放。

The source of this discrepancy lies in the fact that historians, studying events in the light of the letters of the sovereigns and of generals, of narratives, reports, projects, and so on, have assumed quite falsely that the plan of that period of the campaign of 1812 was to cut off and capture Napoleon and his marshals and his army.
这种矛盾的根源在于历史学家们根据君主和将军的信函、叙述、报告、计划等材料研究事件，错误地假设1812年战役的这个阶段的计划是要切断和俘虏拿破仑和他的元帅以及他的军队。

Such a plan never was, and could not have been, the aim of the Russian army, because it had no meaning, and its attainment was utterly out of the question.
这样的计划从来不存在，也不可能存在，因为它毫无意义，其实现完全不可能。

There was no object in such a plan. In the first place, because Napoleon’s army was flying in disorder at its utmost possible speed out of Russia; —
这样的计划没有任何目标。首先，因为拿破仑的军队正在以可能的最高速度混乱逃离俄罗斯； —

that is to say, doing the very thing that every Russian most desired. —
也就是说，做着每一个俄国人都最渴望的事。 —

What object was there in conducting all sorts of operations against the French when they were running away as fast as they could already? —
当法军已经尽快撤退的时候，进行各种行动有何意义呢？ —

Secondly, it would have been idle to stop men on the road, whose whole energies were bent on flight. Thirdly, it would have been absurd to lose men in destroying the French army when it was already, without external interference, perishing at such a rate that, without any obstruction of their road, not more than one hundredth of its original number succeeded in crossing the frontier in December.
其次，在路上阻止那些全身心只想逃跑的人纯属徒劳。第三，毁灭法军已经没有必要，因为它已经在没有外部干涉的情况下自行消亡，以至于到了十二月，只有原来数量的百分之一才成功过境。

Fourthly, it was absurd to desire to take prisoners the Emperor, kings, and dukes, since the possession of such prisoners would have greatly enhanced the difficulty of the Russian position, as was recognised by the most clear-sighted diplomatists of the time (J. Maistre and others). —
第四，希望俘虏皇帝、国王和公爵是愚蠢的，因为拥有这样的囚犯将极大地增加俄国的困境，这是当时最明智的外交家（如J. Maistre和其他人）所认可的。 —

Still more absurd would have been the desire to capture the French army when it had dwindled to one-half before reaching Krasnoe, and a division of convoys had to be given up to guard a corps of prisoners, while the Russian soldiers themselves had not always full rations, and the prisoners they did take died of hunger.
尝试在法军到达克拉斯诺前缩小至一半的时候俘获它们，以及必须放弃护卫囚犯军队的一部分运输队，而俄国士兵自己并不总是有充足的口粮，而且他们所俘获的囚犯们也会由于饥饿而死亡，这一切都更加荒谬。

Any plan of cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his army, however carefully thought out, would have been like the action of a gardener who, after driving out a herd of cattle that had been trampling his beds, should run out to belabour the cattle about the head. —
任何精心设计的围剿拿下拿破仑及其军队计划都将像一个园丁的行为一样，这个园丁赶走了践踏他的花坛的一群牛后，却跑出去打牛的头。 —

The only thing that could be said in justification of his proceeding would be that he was greatly incensed. —
唯一可以为他的行为辩护的是他非常激愤。 —

But the authors of this supposed plan cannot plead even this excuse, since theirs were not the gardens that had been trampled.
但是，这个所谓计划的作者们甚至无法以此为借口，因为被践踏的花坛并不是他们的花园。

And, besides being absurd, to cut off the retreat of Napoleon’s army was also impossible.
而且，割断拿破仑军队的撤退也是不可能的。

It was impossible, in the first place, because, since experience shows that the movement of columns in a single battlefield at five versts’ distance never coincides with the plan of their movements, the probability that Tchitchagov, Kutuzov, and Wittgenstein would all reach an appointed spot in time was so remote that it practically amounted to impossibility. —
一、这在一开始就是不可能的，因为根据经验表明，五个运动趾之间的距离从来不会与他们的运动计划相吻合。因此，要指望蒂奇亚戈夫、库图佐夫和维特根斯坦都能按时到达约定地点的可能性太小，几乎等于不可能。 —

As Kutuzov in fact regarded it when he said that man? —
实际上，库图佐夫认为当他说人时 —

uvres planned at great distances do not produce the results expected of them.
在很远的距离上计划的工程并未产生预期的结果

Secondly, it was impossible, because to paralyse the force of inertia with which Napoleon’s army was rebounding back along its track, incomparably greater forces were needed than those the Russians had at their command.
其次，这是不可能的，因为要消除拿破仑军队所反弹回去的惯性力，需要比俄国军队拥有的力量更加庞大。

Thirdly, it was impossible, because the military expression, to cut off, was really no meaning. —
第三，这是不可能的，因为军事术语“断绝联系”实际上没有意义。 —

One may cut off a slice of bread, but not an army. —
人可以截断一片面包，但不能截断一支军队。 —

To cut off an army—that is, to bar its road—is impossible, because there are always many places by which the men can make a circuit to get out, and there is always the night, during which nothing can be done; —
截断一支军队，也就是封堵它的行军道路是不可能的，因为总有许多地方可以绕道而行，而且总有夜晚，在那期间什么都做不了。 —

a fact of which the military strategists might have been convinced by the examples of Krasnoe and Berezina. —
这一点军事战略家们本应根据克拉斯诺耶和别列津纳的例子而有所确认。 —

One can never take a prisoner unless he agrees to be taken, just as one can never catch a swallow, though of course it is possible if it settles on one’s hand. —
除非一个人同意被俘，否则永远无法抓住他，就像永远无法捉住燕子一样，尽管当然如果它停在一个人的手上是可能的。 —

One can take a prisoner who will surrender, as the Germans did, in accordance with the rules of strategy and tactics. —
一个能像德国人那样根据战略和战术规则投降的俘虏是可以被擒获的。 —

But the French soldiers very wisely did not feel it incumbent on them to do so, since death from cold and hunger awaited them as much if taken prisoner, as if persisting in their flight.
但是法国士兵非常明智地认为这并非是他们义不容辞的责任，因为无论其是否被俘，饱受寒冷和饥饿的死亡都等待着他们。

The fourth and chief reason why it was impossible is that war was waged in 1812 under conditions more terrible than ever since the world has existed; —
第四个也是最主要的一个原因是1812年战争在比世界上任何时候都更可怕的环境下爆发； —

and the Russian troops strained every nerve in the pursuit of the French, and could not have done more without perishing themselves.
俄军为追击法国人耗尽了一切力量，如果再付出更多代价，他们将无法幸免于难。

The Russian army lost in its march from Tarutino to Krasnoe fifty thousand sick or stragglers, that is, a number equal to the population of a large provincial town. —
俄军从塔鲁廷诺到克拉斯诺耶的行军中失去了五万名病人或掉队者，相当于一个大省会城市的人口。 —

Half of the army was lost without a battle.
一半的军队是在没有战斗的情况下失去的。

At this period of the campaign the soldiers were without boots or fur-lined coats, on half rations, without vodka, camping out at night for months in the snow with fifteen degrees of frost; —
在这个阶段的战役中，士兵们没有靴子或毛皮大衣，吃的是一半的口粮，没有伏特加，在零下十五度的雪地里露宿数月。 —

while there were only seven or eight hours of daylight, and the rest was night; —
在只有七八个小时的白昼，其余全是黑夜的时候， —

where discipline could not exert the same influence, and men were put in peril of death, not for a few hours, as on the field of battle, but for whole months together were keeping up a struggle every moment with death from cold and hunger. —
在纪律无法发挥同样的影响力、人们被置于死亡的危险中、不是仅几个小时，而是整整数月、每一刻都与饥寒交战的时候， —

And of this period of the campaign, when half the army perished in one month, the historians tell us that Miloradovitch ought to have made an oblique march in one direction, and Tormasov in another, and Tchitchagov ought to have advanced to this point (the men advancing knee-deep in the snow), and that so and so pushed through and cut the French off, and so on, and so on.
而关于这一战役期间、军队在一个月内有一半士兵丧生的时候，历史学家告诉我们、米洛拉多维奇应该进行一次斜向行军、托马索夫另选另一个方向、奇查戈夫应该向此地前进（士兵在积雪中膝深前进），如此这般、如此这般地进行切断法国人的行动。

The Russian soldiers did all that could or ought to have been done to attain an end worthy of the people, and half of them died in doing it. —
俄罗斯士兵尽其所能或者说应该做到了、以为人民体面的目标而战、并且其中一半士兵在为之而战中丧生。 —

They are not to blame because other Russians, sitting in warm rooms at home, proposed that they should do the impossible.
他们不该被指责、因为另外的俄罗斯人坐在温暖的屋子里、提议他们去做不可能的事情。

All this strange discrepancy between the facts and the accounts of historians, so difficult to understand to-day, arises simply from this, that the historians wrote the history of the noble sentiments and fine speeches of various generals, and not the history of the events themselves.
今天很难理解的所有这些基本事实与历史学家所述的账报之间的奇特不合之处、完全仅仅是源于历史学家写下了各位将领高尚情操与美妙演说的历史、而不是事件本身的历史。

They attach great consequence to the words of Miloradovitch, to the honours bestowed on this general or that, and the proposals made by them. —
他们对米洛拉多维奇的言辞、对这位将领或者那位将领所赋予的荣誉、以及由他们所提出的建议赋予了极大的重要性。 —

But the question of the fifty thousand men who lay in the hospitals and graveyards does not even interest them, for it does not come within the scope of their researches.
然而、关于那五万名躺在医院和墓地中的士兵的问题、他们甚至都不感兴趣、因为那不在他们的研究范畴内。

And yet we have but to turn away from researches among the reports and plans of the generals, and to look into the movements of those hundred thousand men who took direct immediate part in the events; —
然而、我们只需将目光从将领们的报告和计划中移开、而去看那参与事件的十万士兵的行动； —

and all the questions that seemed insoluble before can be readily and certainly explained with extraordinary ease and simplicity.
所有先前看似无解的问题、只需以极大的轻松和简单、得到明确而确定的解答。

The plan of cutting off Napoleon and his army never existed save in the imagination of some dozen men. —
切断拿破仑和他的军队的计划从来都只存在于少数几个人的想象中。 —

It could not have existed because it was absurd and could not be carried out.
这个计划本来就是荒谬的，不可能实施。

The people had a single aim: to clear their country of the invaders. —
人民只有一个目标：清除侵略者。 —

That aim was effected primarily of itself, since the French were flying, and all that was necessary was not to check their flight. —
这个目标本身就得到了实现，因为法国人正在逃离，只需要不阻止他们的逃跑即可。 —

It was promoted, too, by the irregular warfare kept up by the people destroying the French army piecemeal; —
人民还通过不断地消灭法国军队的非正规战争来促进这一目标的实现； —

and thirdly, by the great Russian army following in the rear of the French, ready to use force in case there were any pause in their retreat.
第三，还有伟大的俄国军队在法国军队的后面追击，随时准备使用武力，以防他们停下来逃跑。

The Russian army had to act as a whip urging on a fleeing animal. —
俄国军队就像是鞭子，驱使着一只逃跑的动物。 —

And the experienced driver knew that it was better to keep the whip raised as a menace than to bring it down on the creature’s back.
有经验的驯兽师知道，将鞭子高高举起作为一种威胁要比在动物的背上用力抽打更好。