KUTUZOV had, on the 1st of November, received from one of his spies information that showed the army he commanded to be in an almost hopeless position. —
库图佐夫于11月1日得到一个间谍的消息，显示他指挥的军队处境几乎无望。 —

The spy reported that the French, after crossing the bridge at Vienna, were moving in immense force on Kutuzov’s line of communications with the reinforcements marching from Russia. —
间谍报告称，法国人在维也纳的桥上过河后，正以庞大的力量向库图佐夫与从俄罗斯行军前来的增援队沟通线逼近。 —

If Kutuzov were to determine to remain at Krems, Napoleon’s army of a hundred and fifty thousand men would cut him off from all communications, and would surround his exhausted army of forty thousand, and he would find himself in the position of Mack before Ulm. If Kutuzov decided to leave the road leading to a junction with the Russian reinforcements, he would have to make his way with no road through unknown country to the mountains of Bohemia, pursued by the cream of the enemy’s forces, and to give up all hope of effecting a junction with Buxhevden. —
如果库图佐夫决定留在克雷姆斯，拿破仑的十五万人的军队将切断他与所有通讯，将包围他疲惫不堪的四万人军队，他将陷入像乌尔姆前的麦克那样的困境。如果库图佐夫决定离开通往俄罗斯增援队汇合的道路，他将不得不在没有道路的未知地域中穿行，被敌军精英追赶，放弃与布修夫登会合的希望。 —

If Kutuzov decided to march by the road from Krems to Olm? —
如果库图佐夫决定沿着从克雷姆斯到奥尔姆的道路前进？ —

tz to join the forces from Russia he ran the risk of finding the French, who had crossed the Vienna bridge, in advance of him on this road, and so being forced to give battle on the march, encumbered with all his stores and transport, with an enemy three times as numerous and hemming him in on both sides. —
如果从俄罗斯加入军队，他冒着在这条道路上被法国人抢先一步，被迫在行军过程中带着所有粮草和运输部队与敌人交战的风险，而且对方人数是他的三倍，双方都把他包围起来。 —

Kutuzov chose the last course.
库图佐夫选择了最后一种方式。

The French, after crossing the river, had, as the spy reported, set off at a quick march toward Znaim, which lay on Kutuzov’s line of routes more than a hundred versts in front of him. —
根据间谍报告，法国人过了河之后，以快速行军的方式朝着兹奈姆前进，后者位于库图佐夫线路上，比他还要前面一百多公里。 —

To reach Znaim before the French offered the best hopes of saving the army. —
在法国人之前到达兹奈姆是挽救军队的最好希望。 —

To allow the French to get to Znaim before him would mean exposing the whole army to a disgrace like that of the Austrians at Ulm, or to complete destruction. —
如果允许法国人先到达兹奈姆，将意味着把整个军队暴露在像奥尔姆那样的耻辱或完全毁灭的危险中。 —

But to arrive there before the French with the whole army was impossible. —
但是要想带着整个军队在法国人之前到达那里是不可能的。 —

The road of the French army from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the Russians’ road from Krems to Znaim.
法国军队从维也纳到兹奈姆的路线比俄国人从克雷姆斯到兹奈姆的路线更短更好。

On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent Bagration’s advance guard of four thousand soldiers to the right over the mountains from the Krems-Znaim road to the Vienna and Znaim road. —
在得到消息后的晚上，库图佐夫派遣了巴格拉季昂领导的四千士兵先行前往克雷姆斯-兹奈姆道路右侧的山区，前往维也纳和兹奈姆道路。 —

Bagration was to make a forced march, to halt facing towards Vienna and with his back to Znaim, and if he succeeded in getting on the road in advance of the French, he was to delay them as long as he could. —
巴格拉季昂被要求进行强行行军，面朝维也纳，背对兹奈姆，并且如果他能在法军之前到达这条道路上，他要尽可能地拖延他们。 —

Kutuzov himself with all the transport was making straight for Znaim.
库图佐夫本人带着所有的运输工具直接前往兹奈姆。

Bagration marched forty-five versts, by night in stormy weather, through the mountains, with no road, and with hungry, barefoot soldiers. —
巴格拉季昂在暴风雨中，夜间徒步穿过山区行军四十五个华尔斯，没有道路，并且士兵们饥饿且赤脚。 —

Leaving a third of his men straggling behind him, Bagration reached Hollabrunn, on the Vienna and Znaim road, a few hours before the French, who marched upon Hollabrunn from Vienna. —
巴格拉季昂在留下三分之一的士兵滞后后，几个小时早于从维也纳向霍拉布伦行军的法军到达了位于维也纳和兹奈姆道路上的霍拉布伦。 —

Kutuzov needed fully another twenty-four hours to get to Znaim with all the transport, and so to save the army Bagration would have had, with his four thousand hungry and exhausted soldiers, to have kept at bay the whole army of the enemy confronting him at Hollabrunn for four-and-twenty hours, and this was obviously impossible. —
库图佐夫需要再花上二十四个小时才能带领所有运输队到达兹奈姆，因此巴格拉季翁必须用他那四千饥饿疲惫的士兵在霍拉布龙为二十四个小时与他面对面的整个敌军抵抗，而这显然是不可能的。 —

But a freak of fate made the impossible possible. —
但命运的变幻使得不可能变为了可能。 —

The success of the trick that had given the Vienna bridge into the hands of the French encouraged Murat to try and take in Kutuzov too. —
法国夺取了维也纳桥的伎俩的成功激励了穆拉特试图夺取库图佐夫。 —

Murat, on meeting Bagration’s weak detachment on the Znaim road, supposed it to be the whole army of Kutuzov. —
穆拉特在遇到巴格拉季翁在兹奈姆路上的薄弱分队时，以为这就是库图佐夫的整个军队。 —

To give this army a final and crushing defeat he waited for the troops still on the road from Vienna, and to that end he proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that neither army should change its position nor stir from where it was. —
为了给这支军队最后一击并使其溃败，他等待维也纳上路的部队，为此他提议停战三天，条件是双方都不改变阵地，也不离开原地。 —

Murat averred that negotiations for peace were now proceeding, and that he proposed a truce therefore to avoid useless bloodshed. —
穆拉特声称和平谈判正在进行中，因此他建议停战以避免无谓的流血。 —

The Austrian general, Nostits, who was in charge of the advance posts, believed the statements of Murat’s messengers and retired, leaving Bagration’s detachment unprotected. —
奥地利将军诺斯提斯负责前沿哨所，相信穆拉特使者的陈述，并撤退，使巴格拉季昂的部队没有保护。 —

The other messengers rode off to the Russian line to make the same announcement about peace negotiations, and to propose a truce of three days, to the Russian troops. —
其他使者骑马奔赴俄军阵线，传达和平谈判的相同消息，并提议向俄军提出停火三天。 —

Bagration replied that he was not authorised to accept or to decline a truce, and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov with a report of the proposition made to him.
巴格拉季昂回复说他没有权力接受或拒绝停火，并派遣自己的副官向库图佐夫汇报他所收到的提议。

A truce gave Kutuzov the only possibility of gaining time, of letting Bagration’s exhausted forces rest, and of getting the transport and heavy convoys (the movement of which was concealed from the French) a further stage on their journey. —
停火提供了库图佐夫获得时间的唯一可能，在这段时间里，巴格拉季昂精疲力竭的部队可以得到休息，同时，运输和重要车队（这些行动对法军来说是秘密的）可以继续前进一段路程。 —

The offer of a truce gave the one—and totally unexpected—chance of saving the army. —
停火的提议提供了唯一的、完全意料之外的拯救军队的机会。 —

On receiving information of it, Kutuzov promptly despatched the general-adjutant, Winzengerode, who was with him, to the enemy’s camp. —
得到消息后，库图佐夫立即派遣与他在一起的总务官温岑格罗德到敌军营地。 —

Winzengerode was instructed not only to accept the truce, but to propose terms of capitulation, while Kutuzov meanwhile sent his adjutants back to hasten to the utmost the transport of the luggage of the whole army along the Krems and Znaim road. —
不仅命令温岑格罗德接受停战，还让他提出投降条件，与此同时，库图佐夫派遣他的副官回去加快整个军队行李沿克雷姆斯和兹奈姆道路的运送。 —

Bagration’s hungry and exhausted detachment alone was to cover the movements of the transport and of the whole army, by remaining stationary in face of an enemy eight times stronger numerically.
巴格拉季奥恩的饥饿疲惫部队唯一的任务是在面对八倍于他们的敌人时保护运输和整个军队的行动。

Kutuzov’s anticipations were correct both as to the proposals of capitulation, which bound him to nothing, giving time for part of the transport to reach Znaim, and as to Murat’s blunder being very quickly discovered. —
库图佐夫的预期是正确的，关于投降条件的建议使他不受任何约束，给了一部分运输车辆抵达兹奈姆的时间，并且穆拉特的错误也很快被发现了。 —

As soon as Bonaparte, who was at Sch?nbrunn, only twenty-five versts from Hollabrunn, received Murat’s despatch and projects of truce and capitulation, he detected the deception and despatched the following letter to Murat:
拿破仑，正在斯韦尼布伦的诺伊堡，距离霍拉布龙二十五威尔斯，一收到穆拉的调度和休战和投降计划，他立即察觉到欺骗，并派发以下信件给穆拉：

To Prince Murat.
致穆拉王子。

Sch?nbrunn, 25 Brumaire, year 1805,
斯韦尼布伦，1805年雾月二十五日。

at 8 o’clock in the morning.
早上8点钟。

“It is impossible to find terms in which to express to you my displeasure. —
“我无法找到合适的词来表达我对你的不满。 —

You only command my advance guard and you have no right to make any truce without my order. —
你只指挥我的先锋部队，你没有权力在没有我的命令下达的情况下达成任何停战协议。 —

You are causing me to lose the results of a campaign. —
你正在让我失去一场战役的成果。 —

Break the truce immediately and march upon the enemy. —
立即打破停战协议，向敌人出发。 —

You must make a declaration to them that the general who signed this capitulation had no right to do so, and that only the Emperor of Russia has that right.
你必须向他们宣布，签署这份投降协议的将军没有权力这样做，只有俄罗斯皇帝有这个权力。

“Whenever the Emperor of Russia ratifies the aforesaid convention, however, I will ratify it; —
“只要俄罗斯皇帝批准上述协议，我也将予以批准。 —

but it is only a stratagem. March on, destroy the Russian army … you are in a position to take its baggage and artillery.
但这只是一个计谋。前进，消灭俄军……你有能力夺取他们的行李和火炮。

“The Emperor of Russia’s aide-de-camp is a … Officers are nothing when they have not powers; —
“俄国皇帝的副官是一个……官员们没有权力时就什么都不是； —

this one had none. … The Austrians let themselves be tricked about the crossing of the bridge of Vienna, you are letting yourself be tricked by one of the Emperor’s aides-de-camp.
这个人一点权力都没有……奥地利人在维也纳桥头的渡河问题上被愚弄了，你们在皇帝的一个副官身上也被愚弄了。

“NAPOLEON.”
“拿破仑。”

Bonaparte’s adjutant dashed off at full gallop with this menacing letter to Murat. Not trusting his generals, Bonaparte himself advanced to the field of battle with his whole guard, fearful of letting the snared victim slip through his fingers. —
波拿巴的副官急速地骑马，带着这封威胁性的信件去找穆拉特。波拿巴不信任他的将领，亲自率领整个近卫军前往战场，害怕让这名被圈套的猎物从指间溜走。 —

Meanwhile the four thousand men of Bagration’s detachment, merrily lighting camp-fires, dried and warmed themselves, and cooked their porridge for the first time for three days, and not one among them knew or dreamed of what was in store for them.
与此同时，巴格拉季昂的四千人编队欢快地点燃篝火，晒干和取暖，煮着他们三天来第一次的粥，他们中没有一个人知道或者梦见了即将发生的事情。